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Commentary
Ronald J. Tabak*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law "anti-
terrorism" legislation containing provisions that will significantly cur-
tail the availability of habeas corpus for state and federal prisoners
whose convictions or death sentences were secured in violation of the
United States Constitution. Just a month earlier, the White House had
publicly recognized that several of the legislation's habeas corpus
provisions might be unconstitutional. [Please note that the legislation
which was enacted in April 1996 is identical to the 1995 Senate-passed
habeas provisions discussed in detail below by Professor 'Larry
Yackle. Publication deadlines did not permit changes to the remainder
of this Commentary or the Capital Punishment Panel Discussion,
which refer to the new statute as "proposed" legislation or a "pro-
posal."] The present Congress previously eliminated federal funding
for the post-conviction capital defender organizations ("PCDOs"),
which had handled numerous habeas corpus proceedings for death
row inmates and advised relatively inexperienced attorneys on other
capital habeas cases.2 At the same time, Congress heightened its
efforts to expand the use of the death penalty, and to shorten the
amount of time between conviction and execution.3 As these congres-
sional activities occur, however, doubts about the fairness of our capi-
tal punishment system continue to grow-and for good reason. In
1995, the South African Supreme Court unanimously held the death
penalty unconstitutional-in large part because the Justices deplored
the unfairness that permeates the capital punishment system in the
United States.4 Meanwhile, Pope John Paul II issued an encyclical
that placed the Catholic Church more clearly in opposition to the im-
plementation of the death penalty in our modem society.5
* Special Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Coordinator of Pro Bono
Program; Chair of the Committee on the Death Penalty for the American Bar
Association's Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities.
1. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on Terrorism and Death Penalty Appeals,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al8; Stephen Labaton, Senate Easily Passes Counterter-
rorism Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at B7.
2. See Eric Zorn, Cutting Subsidy for Death Appeals to Cost Time, Funds, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 21, 1996, § 2, at 1.
3. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 561-68.
4. See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
5. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 611-14.
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In an effort to put these developments -in perspective, the American
Bar Association ("ABA") sponsored a program in August 1995, enti-
tled "Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left In This Corpus?"
An edited transcript of that program follows. This Commentary
highlights some of the issues discussed at the program, and attempts to
examine those issues within a wider context.
In recently discussing the subjects of capital punishment and habeas
corpus with numerous otherwise well-informed people, I learned that
most do not really understand habeas corpus, why it is particularly im-
portant in capital cases, and why the PCDOs' role is vital in these
cases. Accordingly, before considering whether there is "any habeas
left in this corpus," one must answer a more basic question: Why
should anyone care about the viability of habeas corpus proceedings
for death row inmates?
This Commentary first explains what habeas corpus is and why it
must be preserved.6 Next, it will address why state courts frequently
fail to rectify serious constitutional violations.7 It will then discuss
Congress' recent attacks on habeas corpus, including the habeas cor-
pus "reform" legislation and the recent defunding of PCDOs.8 This
Commentary will proceed to explain why writs of habeas corpus are
so endangered9 and to address the overall context in which habeas cor-
pus curtailment is occurring.'0 This Commentary will then point out
that current United States policy on executions runs counter to
worldwide trends." This Commentary concludes by advocating that
bar organizations inform the public that America's current capital pun-
ishment system is so fundamentally unfair that its continued operation,
at least in its present form, cannot be tolerated.12
II. HABEAS CORPUS AND WHY ITS PRESERVATION IS VITAL
In a habeas corpus proceeding, a state prisoner may secure relief
from a federal court if his or her federal constitutional rights have been
so seriously violated as to constitute harmful error.' 3 It is difficult for
a prisoner to get a claim considered in habeas corpus, and even more
difficult to secure relief. For instance, a prisoner cannot secure habeas
6. See infra part 11.
7. See infra part III.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part V.
10. See infra part VI.
1 1. See infra part VII.
12. See infra part VIII.
13. See infra note 286.
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relief if he or she runs afoul of any of the various procedural barriers
to consideration of his claim. 4 The prisoner must have asserted the
constitutional claim in state court on every occasion required by state
law, and must then raise the claim in his first federal habeas petition.'
5
Further, the claim must not (except in highly unusual circumstances)
seek to create "new" federal constitutional law, because even if the
claim seeks a logical extension of existing Supreme Court precedent,
its consideration may be barred under the Court's anti-retroactivity
principles. 16
Despite all these barriers, 17 death row inmates secured relief in about
forty-seven percent of habeas cases decided between 1976 and 1991. 8
In contrast, other convicted felons prevailed in only a small percentage
of non-capital cases.' 9
What kinds of federal constitutional violations have led to such a
high success rate in capital habeas cases? The following are examples
of capital habeas cases in which federal courts granted habeas relief:'
" A mentally deficient man gave the police two vastly different
statements during forty-two hours of uncounselled question-
ing. 2' The latter of the two confessions contained words be-
yond the defendant's capability and, unlike the first confes-
sion, distinctly recited facts that qualified the defendant for
the death penalty.22 In addition, the second statement was
given in a suggestive environment, rendering the statement
involuntary. 2
3
• The grand jury that indicted the defendant was selected in a
process that systematically excluded African Americans.
24
" The prosecution knowingly presented misleading evidence
by using an expert witness to testify that the defendant must
14. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
15. See generally infra note 318 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
default).
16. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 294-96 (1989) (adopting an extremely
restrictive doctrine regarding the retroactivity of constitutional law).
17. Some of these barriers have come into existence, or have become more severe,
only in the last 5-10 years. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
18. See I JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 17 & n.21 (2d ed. 1994).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 11.2c, at 303-26 for a more extensive list (including the cases discussed
in the text accompanying notes 21-45) of successful habeas corpus claims.
21. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 932-35 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
22. Id. at 934-35, 938.
23. Id. at 940-41.
24. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986).
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have been the sole triggerman, even though that same expert
had previously testified at a codefendant's trial that the
codefendant must have been the sole triggerman.25
• The prosecutor withheld investigative reports which con-
tained substantial evidence indicating that someone other
than the defendant may have committed the murder.26
* The prosecutor (1) deliberately withheld the fact that his
chief witness had received a deal for his trial testimony, and
(2) improperly misled the jury by stating in his closing ar-
gument that the absence of such a deal favorably reflected
upon the veracity of the witness.27
* The prosecution suppressed evidence showing that the de-
fendant did not commit the killing. 28
• The defendant was insane at the time of the trial and thus
was not competent to assist his attorney. 29 The defendant
was acquitted of the murder charge after the federal court
ordered a retrial and the defendant was restored to sanity. 30
• The district attorney devised a secret scheme by which he
persuaded the jury commissioners to under-represent
African Americans and women. 3'
* Massive pretrial publicity in a small town compromised
nearly all of the jurors, many of whom had attended the vic-
tims' funerals.
3 2
• The local sheriff handpicked the jury in a case involving the
murder of a police officer.
33
• The prosecutor argued to the jury that the main piece of
evidence, a pair of shorts, was stained with blood, even
though he knew that the stain actually consisted of paint.34
• The judge's charge to the jury unconstitutionally placed the
25. Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1458-60 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd per
curiam, 828 F.2d 670 (11 th Cir. 1987).
26. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962
(1986).
27. Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458 (1 Ith Cir. 1986).
28. Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1357 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090
(1984).
29. Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102, 1112 (11th Cir. 1985).
30. Wallace v. State, 371 S.E.2d 914, 915 n.1, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
3 1. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988).
32. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1539-40 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1164 (1986); Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
33. Thompson v. White, 680 F.2d 1173, 1174 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1177 (1983).
34. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1967).
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burden of proof on the defendant regarding a key element
of the alleged crime."
• The prosecutor based his argument in favor of a death sen-
tence on prior felony convictions that, although stipulated to
by defense counsel, the prosecutor knew did not exist.
36
• The defendant was sentenced to death by a jury unconstitu-
tionally instructed that it could not consider as mitigating
factors his brain damage, his full cooperation with the po-
lice, or his favorable prospect for rehabilitation.
37
* The jury was unconstitutionally instructed in a way that pre-
vented it from considering the defendant's mental retarda-
tion as a factor that would support a sentence other than
death.38
* The prosecutor inaccurately told the jury that a verdict of
death would not be final because the appellate court would
correct any mistakes it made.
39
* The defendant's attorney failed to inform the jury, which
convicted and sentenced the defendant to death, that the
state's only witness-the admitted killer, who testified in re-
turn for a lesser sentence-did not link the defendant to the
murder in his detailed confession to police.40
" Defense counsel filed no pretrial motions, did not try to lo-
cate any defense witnesses, did not interview the defendant's
family or the State's witnesses, did not visit the crime scene,
failed to use possibly exculpatory evidence available from
the State's scientific tests, and failed to seek a new trial when
evidence emerged that the victims were alive after the last
time that the defendant could have been in contact with
them.4'
* Defense counsel failed to present the jury with significant
evidence concerning the defendant's retardation, limited
education, and "poverty-stricken socioeconomic back-
ground"--evidence that might have persuaded the jury to
impose a sentence other than death.42
35. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326 (1985).
36. Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829
(1988).
37. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987).
38. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
39. Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 624-29 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
930 (1987).
40. Smith v. Wainwright, 799 F.2d 1442, 1443-44 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
41. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 611-12 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870
(1984).
42. Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1018-19 (lth Cir. 1991).
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• Neither of the two defense lawyers conducted any investiga-
tion for evidence that might persuade the jury not to impose
the death sentence, because "[e]ach lawyer ... believed...
the other was responsible for preparing the penalty
phase. 43
• Defense counsel did not investigate or otherwise prepare for
the capital sentencing hearing because he was confident that
he could negotiate a sentence other than death."
• Defense counsel failed to bring to the jury's attention evi-
dence relating to the defendant's mental retardation, the fact
that his I.Q. was below forty-one, or that he was only seven
years old at the time of the crime and was not proven to
have had any part in the homicide.45
Even though many death row inmates have obtained relief in federal
habeas proceedings because of constitutional violations that occurred
in state courts, state death row populations continue to increase.46 At
the same time, influenced by intense political pressures, state courts
have not rectified numerous violations of capital defendants' constitu-
tional rights.47
III. WHY STATE COURTS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO RECTIFY SERIOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Why is it that our legal system has had to rely on federal habeas
corpus proceedings to rectify serious constitutional violations? Speak-
ers at our program identified several underlying reasons: the politi-
cization and timidity of elected state court judges," the ineffectiveness
of counsel appointed by state judges to represent indigent capital
defendants, 49 and state judges' frequent unwillingness to rectify the
43. Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011
(1990).
44. Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624-30 (10th Cir. 1988).
45. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1087 (1987).
46. COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMrEE ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION 1 (June 1995)
[hereinafter DEFENDER SERVICES] (noting that in 1982 "1137 inmates occupied the na-
tion's death rows. By 1994, that number had grown to 2710") (footnote omitted). As of
January 1996, the total number of death row inmates was 3061. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
& EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row USA 1 (Winter 1995) [hereinafter DEATH Row USA].
47. See infra part Ill.
48. See infra part 11I.A.
49. See infra part III.B.
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unconstitutional conduct of prosecutors and other law enforcement
personnel."
A. Politicized and Timid State Judges
Stephen Bright discussed the fact that, unlike federal judges, who
are appointed to life terms, state court judges in thirty-two of the thirty-
eight states permitting capital punishment must periodically face the
electorate in seeking re-election or retention. Significantly, numer-
ous incumbent judges have lost bids for re-election because of past
decisions in death penalty cases. Further, some states' attorneys
general continue to attack sitting judges, and threaten to seek their de-
feat because of their decisions in some capital cases.53 Bright also
pointed to a growing trend in judicial elections: the use of simplistic,
"tough on crime" campaign slogans, which in some instances have led
to the election of extremely unqualified judges.'
At an ABA program in 1993, James Exum, former Chief Justice of
the North Carolina Supreme Court, noted that when he ran for Chief
Justice as an incumbent:
Some of the campaign debate got really grizzly. My opponents
would bring up all the times I had dissented in cases involving
the imposition of the death penalty, and I had to come back and
demonstrate all the times I had concurred in cases sustaining the
death penalty. So, it emerged into a battle of statistics.
55
Chief Justice Exum also noted that state judiciaries face increased
attacks-even from otherwise responsible editorial writers-for up-
holding well-established constitutional principles in capital cases. 6 He
warned that as these attacks continue to mount, "the less likely it is
going to be that the state judges will be able to survive if they some-
50. See infra part III.C.
5 1. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
52. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 572 (describing three California
Supreme Court justices who lost their re-election bids because of their decisions on death
penalty cases).
53. See infra notes 358-62 and accompanying text. See also infra note 446 and
accompanying text (discussing the election for Wisconsin Attorney General in 1994).
54. See infra notes 352-57, 378-95, and accompanying text. For example, one
Alabama circuit judge's re-election ads read: "Some complain that he's too tough on
criminals, AND HE IS... " See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
55. James Exum, in Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 271
(1994).
56. Id. at 272-73.
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times overturn death sentences .... I plan to resign. I'm glad I will
not have to run again."57
A statistical analysis published in 1987 supports Bright's point
about the impact of judicial elections on the decision-making of state
court judges in death penalty cases. 58 The study showed that, among
Louisiana state supreme court justices who frequently voted in favor of
criminal defendants' claims, those who were less likely to vote in fa-
vor of capital defendants were justices who were determined to be re-
elected in upcoming elections by constituents whom they perceived to
be generally more conservative on crime issues than they.59 One jus-
tice interviewed for that study candidly stated that he was reluctant to
dissent from the denial of capital defendants' claims because of a fear
of adverse publicity that could harm his re-election prospects.'
Bright also mentioned various ways in which the capital punishment
cases affect, or are affected by, state judicial elections. For example,
in Alabama, one judge received a special designation to handle a well-
publicized capital case shortly before a judicial election, in an apparent
effort to aid his electoral prospects. 6' Also, following the defeat in
1986 of three incumbent justices who were attacked for their decisions
in favor of capital defendants, the California Supreme Court has had
an extremely high affirmance rate in capital cases.62 In addition, in
states that permit judges to override jury sentencing verdicts, elected
judges frequently override jury sentences of life imprisonment in order
to impose the death penalty.6 3 Finally, elected state judges are gener-
ally responsible for the appointment and funding of counsel for indi-
gent defendants. 64 It is not in these judges' political interests to ap-
point counsel who will mount vigorous, and possibly successful, de-
fenses for unpopular capital defendants.65
57. Id. at 273.
58. See Melinda G. Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual
Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1122-23 (1987).
59. Id. at 1123.
60. Id. at 1120.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 372-77.
62. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text. While one of the Justices, Chief
Justice Rose Bird cast 61 reversal votes in 61 capital cases, her two defeated colleagues,
Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin, had voted to affirm in a substantial
percentage of capital cases. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal
Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at A8. Nevertheless, the three were linked together
in campaign ads, which proclaimed that "all three justices needed to lose if the death
penalty is to be enforced." Id.
63. See infra notes 392-95 and accompanying text.
64. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 576-77.
65. See infra notes 382-86 and accompanying text.
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Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter acted in a manner
substantially more principled than that displayed by the judges de-
scribed by Bright. In March 1995, Justice Utter resigned after twenty-
four years on the court, stating that he believed that the legal system is
flawed because capital punishment is unevenly applied, and that there
is no assurance that innocent people will not be executed.66 Justice
Utter began his career "convinced of the death penalty," and helped
seek it as a prosecutor.67 Upon resigning, however, he stated:
I've reached the point where I can no longer participate in a
legal system that intentionally takes human life in capital pun-
ishment cases. We continue to demonstrate no human is wise
enough to decide who should die .... [D]espite our efforts to
treat everyone equally, there are still people condemned for
crimes they didn't commit. 68
B. Ineffective Trial Lawyers
Several of the speakers at the program discussed the poor represen-
tation frequently provided by capital defense counsel, who in most in-
stances are appointed by state judges.69 Sadly, as the speakers indi-
cated, egregious ineffectiveness of counsel in capital cases is not lim-
ited to the "death belt" in the South.70 It permeates some of our large,
industrialized northern states as well.7'
Scharlette Holdman described numerous cases of inadequate repre-
sentation, including those where a trial attorney lied about fluency in
Spanish, which assertedly enabled him to communicate with his
Hispanic client; where an attorney was arrested for driving under the
influence while on his way to the courthouse during jury selection;
where a lawyer failed to interview a single witness before trial; where
defense counsel called his own client a "wetback"; and where a de-
fense attorney asked the jury, in closing argument, to give his African
American client the death penalty.72
66. See Jim Muhlstein, Act of Conscience: Justice Utter Resigns, Says Death Penalty
Fatally Flawed, THE HERALD (Everett, Wash.), Mar. 30, 1995, at Al.
67 Id. at A10.
68. Id. at AI,AO.
69. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 576-77; Comments by Susan
Getzendanner, infra, at 593; Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 585-86.
70. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 585-86 (discussing western
states).
7 1. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 583-86; see also Comments by
Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 593 (discussing Illinois).
72. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 583-86.
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Andrea Lyon stated, based on her long experience with capital cases
in Illinois, that many attorneys give the appearance, but not the reality,
of representation.73 Former United States district court Judge Susan
Getzendanner supported this view.74 From the habeas corpus hearings
that she conducted, Judge Getzendanner learned:
The horror stories that you sometimes hear are sometimes true.
The lawyers did terrible jobs in some of these cases. The defen-
dants were not represented. The lawyers were young, asleep,
drunk. . . . More often than not, lawyers would come in and
testify, for the defendant, that they in fact had performed in-
competently. It would be unjust to deny any defendant his one
clear shot to federal review.75
Stephen Bright discussed the fact that in Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania, counsel in capital cases were traditionally appointed through a
judicially operated patronage system.76 This system led to horrendous
representation by attorneys, which was finally exposed in 1992 by the
Philadelphia Inquirer. While the city has since enacted some
reforms, these reforms do not help the scores of death row inmates
from Philadelphia who received miserable representation under the
patronage system. Sadly, Pennsylvania is now aggressively moving
to execute many of these people. Yet, Pennsylvania's then-Attorney
General, Ernest Preate, acknowledged at several ABA programs that
many capital cases have been characterized by ineffective assistance of
counsel on both sides: ineffectual defense lawyers and poorly trained
prosecutors, whose combined actions violated the defendants' consti-
tutional rights.78
Stephen Bright mentioned several examples of the pervasive capital
representation problems in the South.79 One example concerns a
lawyer in Houston, Texas who sometimes sleeps during trials, but is
nonetheless often appointed to represent defendants charged with capi-
tal crimes.8 0 One Houston judge dismissed a defendant's complaint
73. See Comments by Andrea Lyon, infra, at 587-91.
74. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 593.
75. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 593.
76. See infra notes 401-03 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 401-03 and accompanying text.
78. See e.g., Ernest Preate, Jr., in The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency & Due
Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (1994) (noting that
ineffective counsel on both sides is most clearly demonstrated when "[tihe prosecutor
[does] something he or she shouldn't have done and the defense counsel fail[s] to object
or fail[s] to take advantage of it").
79. See infra notes 383-86 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
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that his lawyer was sleeping, stating that the Constitution "doesn't say
the lawyer has to be awake.",8'
C. Egregious Misconduct by Prosecutors and Others
in Law Enforcement
Violations of a defendant's constitutional rights in capital cases do
not always result from incompetent defense attorneys. Prosecutors
and other law enforcement personnel have also committed unconstitu-
tional acts in capital cases.82 For example, Ricardo Aldape Guerra was
convicted and sentenced to death in Houston, Texas, as a result of
highly improper identification procedures, the omission of crucial ex-
culpatory information from witnesses' statements, the intimidation and
manipulation of witnesses, and the knowing use of false testimony.83
After serving twelve years on death row, Guerra sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, which granted the writ and ordered that
he be retried.84 He secured the retrial in a federal court ruling in 1994
with the assistance of the now-defunct Texas Appellate Practice and
Educational Resource Center, which enlisted pro bono representation
for Guerra from the large Vinson & Elkins law firm.85 Federal district
Judge Kenneth Hoyt, a Reagan appointee, stated in his decision that
"[t]here is no doubt in this court's mind that the verdict would have
been different had the trial been properly conducted." 86
How can innocent men come so close to being executed? A recent
article noted the effects of high-profile cases, which draw intense
scrutiny from the public, and which increase pressures on local prose-
87cutors. The article quoted Robert A. Loeb, a former Cook County
assistant state's attorney.88 He stated that elections of prosecutors by
fearful, angry voters "creates a mood or ethic within the incumbent
8 1. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
82. See Comments by Jeffrey Urdangen, infra, at 606-10 (discussing the Rolando
Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez cases and the politically inspired decisions by the
prosecutor-now Illinois' Attorney General-to repeatedly retry them even after
evidence of their innocence became overwhelming). See also Darryl Van Duch, Recants:
Accused Killer, Once on Death Row, Freed in 3d Trial, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A6
(discussing the same case).
83. See Nicholas Varchaver, 9 mm Away From Death, AM. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 81,
81-82.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id. at 87.
87. Darryl Van Duch, Media Fever Scorches Chicago Prosecutions: Prosecutors Trip
Over High-Profile Cases that Draw Intense Scrutiny, Win Convictions on Thin
Evidence, NAT'LL.J., Nov. 13, 1995, at Al.
88. Id. at A26.
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prosecutor's office in which prosecutors are scared to reject [border-
line] high-profile cases[,] and the effect can snowball."8 9
Does the release of death row inmates wrongly convicted mean that
we can count on state judicial systems to work? Jeffrey Urdangen, a
lawyer for Alejandro Hernandez, an innocent former death row inmate
who was recently freed from an Illinois prison, believes that the Her-
nandez case shows the contrary. 9° He stated:
[Flederal courts need to be involved. Very rarely can the inno-
cent condemned person have the benefit of the public support,
the uncompensated resources, and the time and effort of lawyers
throughout the community like these defendants did. Very
rarely is it so obvious that the wrong men have been convicted.
There are many cases such as this which are still buried in the
system.9'
Far too many prosecutors and law enforcement officers are more con-
cerned about "winning" high profile death penalty cases than serving
justice. As Andrea Lyon pointed out, their lack of concern for justice
is illustrated by the fact that a group of prosecutors calls itself "The
Fryers Club. 92
Of course, many in law enforcement do try to do the right thing.
But even they are confronted by political pressures. Montgomery
County, Maryland State's Attorney Andrew Sonner said that a prose-
cutor who does not seek the death penalty in a high-profile case will
likely have problems being re-elected.93 Sonner added that if he did
not already have a six-term record, he would have been easily defeated
in his very sophisticated county, because he rarely seeks the death
penalty.94 In the political arena, he noted, "the death penalty is the
symbolic, get-tough approach to crime. 95 Moreover, Sonner noted
that he is often confronted by families of victims, who say that if he
does not seek the death penalty he is placing no value on the victims'
lives.96
In New York, where the legislature re-enacted capital punishment in
1995, prosecutors who personally opposed the death penalty reacted to
the new law in strikingly different ways. After the new law was en-
acted, Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson said that he would
89. Id.
90. See Comments by Jeffrey Urdangen, infra, at 606-10.
91. See Comments by Jeffrey Urdangen, infra, at 610.
92. See infra note 428 and accompanying text.
93. See Comments by Andrew L. Sonner, infra, at 602-05.
94. See id. at 604.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 605.
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never seek the death penalty.97 Although he was harshly attacked by
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and the local tabloid newspapers, and even
by the Chair of the Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (writing in his personal capacity), District
Attorney Johnson was overwhelmingly re-elected in November
1995.98 Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, who had
forcefully opposed enactment of the death penalty statute, later stated
that his office would consider whether to seek the death penalty on a
case-by-case basis.99 In contrast, Brooklyn District Attorney Charles
Hynes, although continuing to express his personal opposition to the
death penalty, began creating a special capital punishment unit even be-
fore the death penalty legislation was introduced; publicly stated that he
would personally argue before the jury in favor of the death penalty
when his office seeks capital punishment for the first time; and urged
that the scope of the death penalty statute be expanded."
District Attorney Hynes's headline-grabbing conduct is materially
different from the actions of Wisconsin prosecutors, many of whom
are personally opposed to the death penalty.'0 ' Milwaukee District
Attorney Michael McCann pointed out that when Wisconsin faced the
possible enactment of a capital punishment statute, the state-wide
assistant district attorneys' "union is pursuing a provision in the col-
lective bargaining agreement that assistant district attorneys will not be
put in jeopardy if they refuse to participate in the prosecution of capital
punishment cases."'0 2
On March 19, 1996, after coming under pressure from Governor
Pataki and other politicians to ask for the death penalty in the murder
of a police officer, Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson stated that
his position against seeking the death penalty applied "in general" but
that "[n]othing in life is absolute" and that he would exercise his dis-
cretion in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty against the
suspects in that case. 10 3 On the very next day, however, long before
the time for District Attorney Johnson's 120-day period to exercise his
discretion would have ended, Governor George Pataki took what he
acknowledged to be an extraordinary action: he removed Johnson
97. See infra note 480 and accompanying text.
98. Ian Fisher, Election 1995: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at BI.
99. See infra notes 482-83 and accompanying text.
100. Andrea Peyser, DA Who Hates Death Penalty May Be First to Enforce It, N.Y.
POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at 18.
101. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 597-98, 600.
102. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 598.
103. Jan Hoffman, Prosecutor in Bronx, Under Fire, Softens Stand Against
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al, B5.
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from the case and replaced him with New York Attorney General
Dennis Vacco.1°4 The Governor, who was flanked at a press confer-
ence by the victim's brother, partner, and the police union president,
said he acted because he felt District Attorney Johnson would not ob-
jectively consider seeking capital punishment.° 5 The Governor's de-
cision was criticized by several district attorneys in New York, one of
whom, the Republican District Attorney of Ulster County, said John-
son's removal "sets a precedent which I believe the Governor is going
to regret .... I believe [this] is a decision for the elected District
Attorney and not the Governor."' 10 6 The Governor's action was also
criticized by many bar leaders'0 7 and legal ethics experts.'0° The New
York Times pointed out editorially that "State Attorney General Dennis
Vacco's vehement commitment to the death penalty makes him an es-
pecially poor choice as Mr. Johnson's substitute."' 9 In a similar vein,
the Daily News ran a cartoon showing the Governor wearing a cam-
paign button and standing next to a hooded executioner and saying,
"AND YOU CAN REST ASSURED MY PROSECUTOR WILL
MAKE A SOUND AND FAIR JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE."' 10
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULTS ON HABEAS CORPUS
As Stephen Bright stated, the Supreme Court has greatly increased
the obstacles to securing habeas corpus relief for prisoners whose
constitutional rights have been violated in a manner that constitutes
harmful error."' Congress, moreover, may soon enact legislation that
would make it even more difficult for federal courts to overturn state
court judgments in habeas corpus proceedings." 2 In fact, by moving
to defund the PCDOs, Congress has already made it significantly more
difficult for death row inmates to seek relief through the habeas corpus
process. 13 Meanwhile, the growing politicization of every facet of the
104. Rachel L. Swarns, In Clash on Death Penalty Case, Pataki Removes Bronx
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at A1, A16.
105. Id.
106. Edward Adams & Matthew Goldstein, Prosecutors Bar Critical of Pataki Move,
Mar. 22, 1996, N.Y. L.J., at 4 (quoting Michael Kavanagh).
107. Id. at 1, 4.
108. See Swarns, supra note 104, at A16 (quoting N.Y.U. Law Professor Stephen
Gillers); Monroe H. Freedman, Bronx DA Has Morality, Law on His Side, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 20, 1996, at A39.
109. Mr. Pataki Intervenes, Unwisely, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at A14 (Nat'l Ed.).
110. Mickey Hackman, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 1996, at 20.
111. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
112. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 561-68. See supra text
accompanying note I for the current status of the habeas corpus legislation.
113. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. See also Comments by Andrea
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capital punishment system may also be infecting the Senate's consid-
eration of federal judicial appointments.' 14
A. The Habeas Corpus Legislation
Professor Larry Yackle described the habeas corpus "reform" legis-
lation that passed the Senate in 1995.' That Senate-passed legislation
has now also passed the House and is likely to be enacted in 1996.116
As Professor Yackle noted, the habeas bill's supporters suggested
that the principal impact of the "reform" legislation would be to deter
the filing of multiple, successive habeas corpus petitions." 7 Indeed,
much of the press coverage proceeded on that basis." 8 The Supreme
Court, however, has already rendered multiple, successive petitions
completely ineffective in most cases." 9 By focusing the press' and the
public's attention on those "white elephants," the proponents of the
habeas legislation have largely succeeded in obscuring the most signif-
icant part of the proposed bill: the provision concerning the deference
to be given to state court decisions that find constitutional that which
the federal courts would find unconstitutional. 2 ° The federal courts
currently are allowed to consider federal constitutional issues de novo
in habeas corpus proceedings, without giving any special degree of
deference to the state court holdings in those cases.' 2 ' Under the
habeas "reform" legislation, however, a federal court would have to
presume the validity of state court holdings, with three exceptions
which Professor Yackle examined.122
Lyon, infra, at 587-91 (discussing the impact of PCDOs).
114. See infra part IV.C.
115. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 561-68.
116. See supra text accompanying note I for the current status of the habeas corpus
legislation.
117. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 564.
118. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Anti-Terrorism Bill, WASH. POST, June
8, 1995, at Al, A15; Jerry Gray, Senate Approves Anti-Terror Bill by a 91-To-8-Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at Al.
119. Such successive petitions are still possible in those rare cases in which the
death row inmate not only has a meritorious constitutional claim but also can show a
likelihood "that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence." Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995). As noted in the text below
discussing Schlup's case, the habeas "reform" legislation would bar relief in some
instances in which relief is currently possible under Schlup. See infra notes 154-63 and
accompanying text.
120. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(3) (1995) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994).
122. S. 735 § 604(3). See also infra notes 329-31 and accompanying text (listing
the exceptions).
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How great an impact would this deference provision have?
Professor Yackle stated that he is not sure. 12 3 Nor can anyone else be
sure, because the three exceptions are articulated in language that can
be interpreted in several ways.' 24 What is clear, however, is that un-
der this legislation there would be at least some situations in which the
federal courts could no longer grant habeas corpus relief, because they
would have to give deference to state court constitutional decisions. I
fear, along with Professor Yackle, that a majority of the current Rehn-
quist Court would construe the legislation as significantly curtailing the
federal courts' power to grant habeas corpus relief. As a result,
federal courts would likely deny relief in many situations in which they
find a constitutional violation and conclude that the violation resulted in
harmful error.
As Professor Yackle also stated, the habeas "reform" legislation
would eliminate current safeguards regarding the manner in which
state courts arrive at findings of fact. 25 For example, the "reform"
legislation would make it far more difficult to secure a federal eviden-
tiary hearing, even where crucial facts were not developed in state
court through no fault of the death row inmate. 26
The legislation would also establish filing deadlines for habeas cor-
pus petitions, which, as Professor Yackle pointed out, would be
nearly impossible to meet.' 27 Particularly in the absence of resource
centers, it will be extremely difficult and often impossible for attorneys
to complete the preparation needed for filing post-conviction and
habeas corpus petitions within the one-year or six-month time frames
set forth in the proposed statute. 28 What most advocates of such
deadlines fail to recognize is that proper preparation for such a pro-
ceeding requires, among other things, a complete reinvestigation of the
entire case, which includes a review of the crime itself and factors not
presented at trial that might have led to a non-death sentence.
Although the bill's backers maintain that this legislation would
speed up the capital punishment process, former federal district court
Judge Getzendanner is undoubtedly correct that at least at the outset,
the new law will slow down the process. 29 It will take many years of
litigation to determine how the statute should be interpreted, and
123. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 567-68.
1 24. See S. 735 § 604(3) for the exact language of the proposed statute.
125. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 564-65.
1 26. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 564-65.
1 27. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 562-63.
128. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 563.
129. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 592.
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whether, as construed, the statute is constitutional. 3 ° As former
Judge Getzendanner suggested, it would be much simpler, and speed-
ier, for Congress to simply provide that each prisoner gets one clear
shot at habeas corpus relief.' Sadly, while the press typically reports
that the legislation would do just that, the reality is that in many cases
there will be no clear shot at habeas relief. Furthermore, it may take
many years to determine that no shot will be allowed.
District Attorney McCann noted that some supporters of the habeas
"reform" legislation claim that the proposed new law would make the
capital punishment system less expensive than the current alternative
punishment, life without parole. 3 2 The major reason why the death
penalty system is considerably more expensive than the alternative,
however, is that a far higher percentage of cases go to trial when the
death penalty is sought than otherwise,'33 and those trials are far more
expensive than non-capital trials. 34 These expensive trials then often
end in life sentences. 35 Moreover, despite the intense political pres-
sure applied to state judges, a substantial percentage of the death sen-
tences that are imposed are reversed by the state appellate courts,
leading either to expensive retrials or to life sentences. 36
Thus, even without habeas corpus, the death penalty system would
remain considerably more expensive than the alternative. It would also
be substantially more unfair than at present, because many more death
row inmates-including those who would likely never have been
convicted or sentenced to death if the Constitution had been faithfully
applied-will be executed.
B. Defunding of the Post-Conviction Capital Defender Organizations
During 1995, it became clear that Congress would eliminate funding
for the PCDOs. These resource centers located and/or guided counsel
from private law firms in many state post-conviction and federal
130. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 592; Comments by Professor
Larry Yackle, infra, at 565-66.
13 1. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 592.
132. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 596-97.
1 33. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and
Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 59, 133 (1989).
134. See Robert Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45, 47 (1989).
135. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 83 (1994) (citation omitted).
136. See generally Bob Egelko, High Court Won't Rubber-Stamp Death Penalties,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1989, at A3 (noting that "Itihe average for death sentence reversals
by all state courts is about 41% since 1976") (citation omitted).
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habeas cases, 37 and represented many death row inmates.3 Many of
the PCDOs closed during 1995. Others now limp along with ex-
tremely limited staff, with no prospect of any federal funding.
Stephen Bright ascribed this defunding to opposition generated by
states' attorneys general, who exhibited greater concern for "winning"
cases than for securing justice. 139 In contrast, Bright pointed to a sub-
committee of federal judges, which recommended that the PCDOs
continue to receive funding. " The subcommittee concluded that at a
federal cost of $ 20 million per year, the PCDOs were cost-effective
and improved the quality of representation in capital cases. 4 ' Andrea
Lyon quoted from the subcommittee's report:
Private lawyers who communicated with the Subcommittee al-
most uniformly expressed the view that they would not willingly
represent a death-sentenced inmate without the assistance of a
PCDO or similar organization. State and federal judges agreed
that PCDO assistance was critical to the recruitment of private
attorneys to represent death-sentenced inmates.
1 42
In the absence of PCDOs, some way must be found to locate attor-
neys for death-sentenced inmates, particularly because they have a
statutory right to federal habeas counsel. As Bright stated, however, it
is questionable whether other competent attorneys will somehow de-
cide to get involved in these cases.143 If independent attorneys do get
involved, they will probably be entitled to greater federal payments
than either the PCDO attorneys or many private attorneys guided by
the PCDOs.
As for state post-conviction proceedings, there is a heightened dan-
ger that without PCDOs or any other mechanism to locate or meaning-
137. See Ronald J. Tabak, in The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency & Due
Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (1994) (discussing
Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992), which affirmed the district
court's judgment granting a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant, represented by an
attorney from the ABA post-conviction death penalty project, after being denied the
right to adequate counsel in a capital case).
138. See Mark Hansen, The Murder Case That Unraveled, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 30-
31 (noting that Walter McMillan, who was represented by the Alabama Capital
Representation Resource Center, was freed after spending almost six years on death row
for a murder he did not commit).
139. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 569-70.
140. See infra note 336 and accompanying text. See also Comments by Andrea
Lyon, infra, at 587-91 (stating that the opponents of PCDOs felt the PCDOs were too
effective, since they performed thorough investigations and uncovered unconstitutional
actions, including prosecutors' improper, undisclosed deals with state witnesses).
141. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
142. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
143. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 570-71.
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fully compensate counsel, meritorious constitutional claims will not be
raised at all, or will not be adequately developed. 44 If that occurs, un-
raised claims will likely be barred in federal court and, under the
habeas "reform" legislation, inadequately developed claims would
likely fail without any federal evidentiary hearing. It is possible that
under such circumstances, Justice Kennedy may conclude that the
factual underpinnings of his concurrence in Murray v. Giarratano'4S no
longer exist. Accordingly, the Court may hold that there is a federal
constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.
Hopefully, the Court will not allow states to appoint unqualified
lawyers to handle post-conviction proceedings at "token fees."'"
There is also a growing danger that inadequate counsel, or, for
many years, no counsel at all, will be found to handle the first appeal
in state court, where the Constitution does mandate a right to coun-
sel. 147 In California, several years after the California Supreme Court
took over responsibility for appointing direct appeals lawyers in capital
cases from the State's PCDO, 128 men and 6 women on death row
have no lawyers to handle their direct appeals. 48 As the Los Angeles
Times reported in April 1996, "California is condemning people to
death faster than it can find lawyers to represent them."'' 49 While
Texas does not have the same problem, that is "because court ap-
pointment standards are so low that nearly anyone can apply-includ-
ing lawyers with little or no death penalty experience."' 50 In Penn-
sylvania, where half of the 196 death row inmates have no lawyers,
"the state's standards are so low that they attract death penalty
novices," including "a divorce lawyer" and "a recent law school grad-
uate." '5 ' So, while politicians such as California's Attorney General
Dan Lungren bemoan the delays in executions, they have done little or
nothing to deal with the growing crisis in appellate representation. 52
144. Even in states in which they received no state funding, PCDOs often were able
to recruit private attorneys to handle state post-conviction proceedings by offering
guidance and pointing to the prospect of federal payments for habeas work.
145. 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that under Virginia's
system, "no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to
represent him in post-conviction proceedings").
146. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 571 (discussing the possibility
that states will assign cases to unqualified lawyers who will be paid a token fee).
147. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1968).
148. Mack Reed, An Even Longer Wait on Death Row, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at
Al.
149. Id. atAl4.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. atA14-A15.
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Indeed, they have added to the problem by successfully advocating
expansion of death penalty laws to cover additional crimes and by
spearheading efforts to eliminate funding for the PCDOs-some of
which formerly helped find lawyers to handle direct appeals and pro-
vided them with guidance.
In any event, the defunding of the PCDOs will surely lead to
"decentralization, fragmentation, and less quality representation over-
all," as individual attorneys flail along on their own.'53 It will also
lead to very different outcomes in cases such as that of Lloyd
Schlup. 5 4 In the Schiup case, a Missouri PCDO took his case and
began a thorough investigation, something none of the various court-
appointed attorneys who previously represented Schlup had done.' 55
The PCDO identified more than twenty witnesses willing to come for-
ward and swear to Schlup's innocence. 5 6 Despite this overwhelming
evidence, Schlup still did not secure relief from the lower federal
courts.'57 Missouri Governor Carnahan, troubled by the overwhelm-
ing evidence of innocence, issued a stay eight hours before Schlup's
execution. 158
In January 1995, the Supreme Court held that Schlup might secure
relief if he satisfied a demanding "miscarriage of justice" standard. 59
On remand in federal district court, Chief Judge Jean Hamilton, a
Bush appointee, held that the evidence presented by the Missouri
PCDO was so credible and substantial that "it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted [Schlup] in light of the
new evidence."' 6 In January 1996, Chief Judge Hamilton considered
the merits of Schlup's constitutional claims: that his trial lawyer's in-
153. See Comments by Andrea Lyon, infra, at 590.
154. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
155. See generally id. at 860 (describing an Eleventh Circuit dissenting opinion
criticizing Schlup's trial counsel for failure to conduct individual interviews with any of
the witnesses).
156. See Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 451-54 (E.D. Mo. 1995), for a list of
some of the witnesses willing to come forward and swear to Schlup's innocence. Two of
the witnesses cast serious doubt on the possibility that Schlup participated in the
murder. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869. They stated, under oath, that Schlup arrived in the
dining room 65 seconds before the distress call sounded. Id. A videotape in the dining
room confirmed their accounts. Id. at 855.
157. See, e.g., Schlup v. Armontrout, 945 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 909 (1992); Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
851 (1995).
158. Stuart Taylor, Jr., He Didn't Do It, AM. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 69, 78.
159. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (requiring the habeas petitioner to show that "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent").
160. Schlup, 912 F. Supp. at 455 (quoting Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867).
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effective representation and the State's suppression of exculpatory evi-
dence deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. 6'
With the demise of the PCDOs, it is likely that when another case
like Schlup's comes along, the inmate will be executed because no one
will be there to perform the burdensome work necessary to uncover
and prove the inmate's innocence. Unfortunately, even if the next
Lloyd Schlup does manage to secure dedicated counsel able to conduct
a proper investigation, he may still be executed if the habeas "reform"
legislation is enacted. Ironically, the anti-successor petition provision
of that legislation-which requires the inmate to show his innocence
by "clear and convincing evidence"' 62-- could require the execution of
innocent death row inmates in situations like Schlup's. Indeed, while
Chief Judge Hamilton held that no reasonable juror would have con-
victed Schlup, she maintained that he had not affirmatively proven his
innocence in the demanding way required by the legislation. 63 If the
habeas "reform" legislation is enacted and construed to apply retroac-
tively to prisoners with pending claims, Schlup himself could be a fa-
tality of the habeas "reform" legislation.
C. Past Decisions Used Against Federal Judicial Nominees
A final threat to habeas corpus now emerges from the confirmation
process for federal judicial appointees. The Republicans on the Senate
Judiciary Committee "have seized on their own touchstone, the death
penalty."'' 64 Senator Orrin Hatch, who is now the chairman of the
committee, stated in late 1993 (when the Republicans were in the mi-
nority) that while the death penalty is not a "litmus test," he would op-
pose judges who he believes would look for excuses not to implement
it. 65 In 1993-94, Hatch and many other conservatives opposed the
nominations of Martha Craig Daughtrey and Rosemary Barkett to fed-
eral circuit courts. 166 Both Daughtrey and Barkett were accused of
softness on the death penalty, even though they did not outright op-
pose death sentences as members of state supreme courts. 167 Although
Daughtrey and Barkett were confirmed by the then Democratic-con-
161. Police/Courts (Crime) Column, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1996, at 2B.
Judge Hamilton gave both sides until February 5, 1996 to file additional briefs. Id.
Judge Hamilton had not rendered a decision on this case as of April 15, 1996.
162. S. 735 § 606 (b).
163. Schlup, 912 F. Supp. at 455.
164. See Henry J. Reske, Liberal Detectors: Judicial Nominees Sized up Based on
Death-Penalty Stance, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 14.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
[Vol. 27
Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?
trolled Senate, Chairman Hatch later stated that now that the Repub-
licans control the Senate, "even nominees like Barkett... might not
pass."'
168
Some Republican Senate candidates in 1994 used their opponents'
votes on judicial nominations as a way to fuel the death penalty/soft on
crime issue. As Stephen Bright noted, Senator Bill Frist used such a
campaign to defeat incumbent Senator Jim Sasser. 169 The Frist cam-
paign criticized Sasser for voting to confirm Judge Barkett and for rec-
ommending the appointment of a federal district court judge who
granted habeas relief to a woman convicted of murder. 70
Federal judicial appointments have already become a political foot-
ball in the 1996 presidential election campaign. After Judge Harold
Baer, Jr. issued an unpopular ruling in a drug case (a ruling he later
reversed), President Clinton initially responded by having his press
secretary decline to rule out the possibility of seeking Judge Baer's
resignation.' 7' Senator Robert Dole, the presumptive Republican
presidential nominee, said Judge Baer "ought to be impeached instead
of reprimanded" if he did not resign, and attacked the President for ap-
pointing "liberal judges."' 7 2 The Clinton administration responded to
this and other Republican criticism by attacking some judicial ap-
pointees of Republican presidents as soft on crime, "in a kind of 'your
judges are softer on crime than our judges' tit for tat."' 73 As part of
this flurry of judge-bashing, Senator Hatch complained about Third
Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin and Eleventh Circuit Judge Rosemary
Barkett for their decisions in some death penalty cases and federal dis-
trict Judge James A. Beatty, Jr. (who has been nominated to the
Fourth Circuit) for voting to overturn a murder conviction.'74
The injection of death penalty decisions into the federal judicial con-
firmation process poses several dangers to habeas corpus, and to due
process generally. First, it decreases the likelihood that judges who
would seriously consider habeas corpus claims in high-profile cases
will be confirmed. Second, it decreases the likelihood that federal dis-
168. See Joan Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH.
.POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at Al.
169. See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
17 1. Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al,
(Nat'l Ed.).
172. Katharine Q. Seelye, Dole Tours Death Chamber in San Quentin and Calls for
Speedier Executions, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1996, at A14 (Nat'l Ed.).
173. Greenhouse, supra note 171, at AI0.
174. Eric Schmitt, Senator Renews Attack on Clinton's Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1996, at B9.
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trict or circuit court judges with hopes of being appointed to a higher
court will grant relief in controversial habeas corpus cases. Finally, it
decreases the likelihood that state court judges who aspire to the fed-
eral bench will grant relief to death row inmates even when they be-
lieve relief is warranted. In short, the politicization of the federal judi-
cial nomination process based on death penalty decisions threatens to
(1) inject into the federal judiciary some of the same problems that
have afflicted state courts, and (2) intensify the political pressures on
state court judges.
V. WHY WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS ARE So ENDANGERED
Politics is the principal reason why habeas corpus is in such danger.
Politics is why Senator Frist attacked former Senator Sasser for his
judicial confirmation votes. Politics drives the other developments that
make unconstitutional executions-even of innocent people-consid-
erably more likely and why the supposed softness on crime of federal
judicial appointees has already become a political football in the 1996
presidential race. As Professor Yackle noted, conservative politics is
not the only reason why habeas corpus is in such precarious shape. 17 5
Other reasons for the attack on habeas corpus include a desire to en-
courage increased executions in the various states and hostility towards
the Supreme Court's commitment to constitutional rights. 17 6
One might have thought that a President who once taught constitu-
tional law and whose wife once represented a death row inmate would
veto legislation that substantially curtails habeas corpus. However,
President Clinton stated on Larry King Live that the habeas corpus
provisions should be kept in the anti-terrorism legislation. 177
Clinton's position, in effect, "pulled the rug out" from under those in
Congress who were trying to remove or change the habeas corpus
provisions in the Senate bill.
District Attorney McCann noted that President Clinton ran commer-
cials in the summer of 1995 that advocated expanding the death
175. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 562.
176. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, infra, at 562.
177. See A Hasty Response to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at A28
(criticizing President Clinton because "[a]fter resisting Republican attempts to smuggle
into the terrorism bill a pet proposal to limit death row appeals in Federal courts, he
surrendered Monday night on a television talk show and embraced this so-called 'habeas
corpus reform"'); Anthony Lewis, Mr. Clinton's Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at
A25 (criticizing President Clinton for stating on Larry King Live that the "reform 'ought
to be done in the context of this terrorism legislation"').
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penalty. 7 8 As a Democrat, he was shocked. 179 He recognized that
Clinton's position would harm efforts to prevent enactment of the
death penalty in Wisconsin. 80
How can President Clinton's acquiescence in habeas corpus
"reform" legislation be explained? State's Attorney Sonner, also a
Democrat, was on target when he said that "the Democrats [are] trying
to trump the Republicans on this issue. When Democrats simply come
out in favor of the death penalty, there is not a Willie Horton-type of
issue to define the difference between the Democrats and the
Republicans." '' 8'
Meanwhile, Republicans are trying to outmaneuver the President so
they can accuse him of coddling death row inmates by opposing
habeas corpus "reform" legislation. Knowing that the President would
veto a bill to temporarily keep the government open during budget ne-
gotiations in November 1995, the Republicans included the habeas
corpus provisions in that bill. 82 The Republicans were undoubtedly
gratified when USA Today reported, inaccurately, that the inclusion of
the habeas corpus legislation was one of the reasons why the President
vetoed that bill. 83 Senator Robert Dole, the presumptive Republican
nominee for President, asserted during a March 1996 trip to
California's death chamber, that President Clinton had vetoed habeas
limits for death row inmates three times. 84 The White House re-
sponded by saying that the President supported speeding the process
up and had vetoed the habeas measure only once, and only because it
was part of other legislation which he opposed.' 85
What underlies all of this partisan maneuvering, in which support
for habeas corpus is equated with opposition to the death penalty and
weakness on crime? Politicians want to show that they "hear" the
public's outrage over high crime levels. They increasingly believe that
the two best ways to express their position on crime are to support the
178. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 600.
179. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 600.
180. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 600.
18 I. See Comments by Andrew L. Sonner, infra, at 604.
182. See William M. Welch, Tangled Lines of Budget Politics End in a Knot, USA
TODAY, Nov. 13, 1995, at 5A.
183. William M. Welch, Resignation Settles in as Clock Winds Down, USA TODAY,
Nov. 14, 1995, at 7A (noting that on November 13, 1995 President Clinton vetoed a
resolution to extend the nation's ability to borrow money because he objected to
Congress' budget demands and "[he] also dislikes ... limiting appeals in death penalty
cases").
184. Seelye, supra note 172, at A14.
185. Id.
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death penalty and to advocate measures that purportedly will make ex-
ecutions occur more quickly, thereby supposedly deterring the com-
mission of future crimes.
Ironically, the ineffectiveness of our death penalty system in reduc-
ing crime fuels the frustration on which such politicians feed. The
uselessness of capital punishment as a crime fighting measure is
detailed in a recent book by David Von Drehle, who studied the death
penalty's implementation in Florida. 86 One of the book's most telling
quotations comes from Ray Marky, who helped write the Florida death
penalty statute while working in the Florida Attorney General's office,
and who spent years fighting to uphold and enforce it. He told the
author:
"If we had deliberately set out to create a chaotic system, we
couldn't have come up with anything worse. It's a merry-go-
round, it's ridiculous; it's so clogged up only an arbitrary few
ever get it ....
... I don't get any damn pleasure out of the death penalty
and I never have .... [F]rankly, if they abolished it tomorrow,
I'd go get drunk in celebration."' 8
7
Marky is not unique among law enforcement officials in this as-
sessment. A national poll of the nation's police chiefs in 1995 showed
that police chiefs rank the death penalty at the bottom of the list of
measures to reduce violent crime. Only one percent said it is the best
way to deal with violent crime. 88 Two-thirds stated it does not signif-
icantly reduce the number of murders, and most said it is not an effec-
tive law enforcement tool.'89 State's Attorney Sonner agreed, stating:
There is absolutely no value to the prosecution of having the
death penalty. There is an absolutely huge cost in the admini-
stration of it. As conscientiously as I try to do it, I must confess
that I do not know how to do it and achieve fairness ....
[I]t is chaos now, and it is also false promises. 190
Furthermore, in 1995, Judge Alex Kozinski, a conservative Reagan
appointee to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated that death
penalty statutes are far too broad.'' He believes that the death penalty
186. DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD (1995).
187. Id. at 409.
188. See Patrick Murphy, Death Penalty Useless, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at
I IA.
189. Id.
190. See Comments by Andrew L. Sonner, infra, at 602. See also Comments by E.
Michael McCann, infra, at 600 (noting that a slight majority of Wisconsin district
attorneys oppose the death penalty).
191. Stuart Taylor, Jr., For the Record, AM. LAW., Oct. 1995, at 69, 72 (interview of
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laws should be overhauled, and that the death penalty should be im-
posed only in the most egregious cases.' 92
Thus far, Judge Kozinski's suggestions have been ignored by state
and federal legislators. Instead, in state after state, and in Congress,
politicians react to each widely publicized crime by advocating a wider
scope for the death penalty. Executions increased to over fifty in
1995, the largest number since executions resumed in the late
1970s.193 The accelerating pace of executions has had no evident im-
pact on crime, however. In New York City, when there was no death
penalty, the murder rate dropped so greatly in the first half of 1995 that
on July 8, 1995, the front-page lead headline of the New York Times
Judge Alex Kozinski). Specifically, Judge Kozinski stated:
I am concerned that we-particularly in the federal courts-are going to drown
in a sea of death penalty cases in the next few years. We have only seen the
tip of the iceberg ....
They involve a complexity and intensity of purpose on both sides that you
don't see in other cases. And I think this is taking a major toll on the
resources we have to administer justice.
.. .These are issues that are unique to death cases, and this results in a very
complicated process, one that very few lawyers are capable of handling.
So we now have 100 cases or more in California alone for which they can't
find lawyers to handle the appeals. They're kind of stuck.
• . I think there's little likelihood we're going to do away with it altogether,
but I think we can do a better job of administering it. My suggestion is that
we limit it to the most egregious cases, that we narrow the category of
aggravating circumstances, that we put on death row only individuals guilty of
such heinous conduct, such depravity, that the death penalty is really
appropriate. And then concentrate on pushing those cases through the
system.
... There are not that many people who are actually involved in administering
the death penalty. A lot of people are willing to say they're for it . . . . But
you don't really know how you feel about it until you've been involved in it,
and actually been there, and lived through a case where the defendant is put to
death.
Even for somebody like me, who generally has no qualms about the death
penalty, thinks it's appropriate in certain circumstances, and has no
constitutional problems with it ...
But still and all, I find it hard. I find it hard, going through these cases.
Maybe if we had 30 at a time, I'd get numb to the discomfort I feel at having to
participate in taking away human life. But I hope that that point will never
come.
Id. at 71 (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski).
192. Id.
193. Tony Mauro, Pace of Executions Likely to Increase, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1995,
at 3A (stating that "[tlhe 56 executions in 1995 were the most since capital punishment
was reinstated in 1976"); see also DEATH Row USA, supra note 46, at 8-9 (individually
listing each person executed in the United States in 1995).
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was "Murder Rate Plunges in New York City; A 25-Year Low in First
Half this Year."' 194 Nevertheless, on September 1, 1995, the death
penalty returned to New York. 95 Andrea Lyon gave the most succinct
explanation for the current trends in death penalty laws: "rather than try
to understand the causes, we simply want to kill the effects."'
196
VI. THE OVERALL CONTEXT IN WHICH HABEAS CORPUS
CURTAILMENT IS OCCURRING
A. Innocent People Still Face Execution
In 1995, evidence that innocent people are sentenced to death and
face execution continued to mount.' 97 For example, on June 1, 1995,
after serving more than fourteen years on Arizona's death row, Robert
Charles Cruz was acquitted at his retrial and released from prison.'98
Jurors said that the main reason for their acquittal of Cruz was the lack
of credibility of some key State witnesses, particularly one whom the
foreman described as "a proven liar."' 99 The foreman of the jury also
cited the lack of a motive for Cruz, and the lack of physical evidence
linking Cruz directly to the killings. 2°°
194. Clifford Krauss, Murder Rate Plunges in New York City; A 25-Year Low in First
Half this Year, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at Al.
195. The death penalty was reinstated in New York following the defeat in 1994 of
Governor Mario Cuomo. James Dao, Death Penalty In New York Reinstated After 18
Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al. I do not believe that
Cuomo's opposition to the death penalty was a significant factor in his defeat. But he
did lose support by refusing to send Thomas Grasso, an Oklahoma death row inmate who
wanted to be executed, back to Oklahoma while time remained on his New York criminal
sentence. See Kevin Sack, Pataki, Backing Executions, Assails Cuomo at Murder Site,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, at 1, 28. New York's new governor did send Grasso back.
See Russell Baker, Pataki Takes the Hood, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995, at 23. Just before
his execution, Grasso wrote: "Mario Cuomo is wright [sic] .... Life without parole is
much worse than the death penalty." John Kifner, Grasso's Farewell: 'Life Without
Parole' Worse than Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at B6. In cases such as Grasso's,
our legal system is assisting what amounts to suicides of people who refuse to mount
any defense at trial, who ask that the death penalty be imposed, and who waive all
appeals.
1 96. See Comments by Andrea Lyon, infra, at 589.
197. See Comments by Jeffrey Urdangen, infra, at 606-10 (discussing the Rolando
Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez cases); supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text
(discussing the Ricardo Aldape Guerra case); supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the Lloyd Schlup case). See also Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at
595-96 (pointing out that even prosecutors who act professionally sometimes secure
murder convictions of innocent people).
198. Brent Whiting & Pamela Manson, 5th Trial Clears Man in 2 Murders; He Walks
Free from Death Row's Shadow, ARIZ. REPUB., June 2, 1995, at Al.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Similarly, on April 5, 1995, Adolph Munson was acquitted at his
retrial, after serving ten years on Oklahoma's death row. 20' At the trial
in which Munson was convicted, the police withheld hundreds of
pages of exculpatory reports and photographs, which suggested that a
white individual, rather than the African American Munson, committed
the crime. 2°2 Further, the judge in the original trial denied funds to the
court-appointed defense lawyers for independent forensic tests because
"the county could not afford [them] ."203
Furthermore, Joseph Spaziano recently won the right to a new trial
after spending almost twenty years on Florida's death row.2 4 In the
Spaziano case, the State's key witness recently recanted his testi-
mony.2 5 That testimony was the product of police investigators hyp-
notizing and giving inducements to the witness.2°6 Spaziano's trial oc-
curred before Florida banned the use of hypnotically induced testi-
mony.2 °7
Meanwhile, executions are continuously carried out despite serious
questions about the defendants' guilt. Numerous examples illustrate
this serious problem. The impending execution of Jesse Dewayne
Jacobs in January 1995 led the conservative Washington Times to run
this headline: "Justices Vote 6-3 To Let Wrong Killer Die". 208 After
securing Jacobs's confession, conviction and death sentence, Texas
prosecutors used Jacobs as their star witness in the trial of his sister,
who was convicted of committing the same shooting.2° Indeed, pros-
ecutors stated that Jacobs's confession was a fabrication and that he
had no idea his sister was going to shoot the victim."0 Nonetheless,
the State still executed Jacobs on January 4, 1995.1
201. See Richard L. Fricker, State Falters in Retrial of Escaped Con, A.B.A. J., June
1995, at 38.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. State v. Spaziano, No. 75-430-CFA, slip op. at 8 (Seminole County Ct., Jan.
22, 1996).
205. Id. at I.
206. Id. at 5.
207. See David Von Drehle, A Hypnotized Witness, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1995, at
A25.
208. Frank J. Murray, Justices Vote 6-3 To Let Wrong Killer Die, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
4, 1995, at A4. At Jacobs's trial, the prosecution stated: "The simple fact of the matter
is that Jesse Jacobs and Jesse Jacobs alone killed Etta Ann Urdiales." Id.
209. Id. At Jacobs's sister's trial, that same prosecutor's office stated: "I'm
convinced that Jesse Jacobs is telling the truth when he says that Bobbie Hogan is the
one that pulled the trigger," and that Jacobs did not know of his sister's homicidal
intent. Id.
210. Id.
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Barry Lee Fairchild, a poor, probably retarded African American,
was convicted and sentenced to death for killing a young white woman
in Arkansas." 2 Police arrested and abusively questioned thirteen other
African American men as suspects in connection with the same
crime.1 3 Three policemen later testified that Fairchild too was abu-
sively questioned and otherwise subjected to a coercive investiga-
214tion. On his videotaped confession, Fairchild's head was ban-
daged, due to an attack by a police dog.2"5 At Fairchild's trial, the jury
was probably impressed by testimony that the police had retrieved the
victim's black watch from Fairchild's sister. 21 However, Fairchild's
lawyers later found a previously undisclosed police file showing that
the victim had actually worn a shiny metallic watch, not a black one,
on the day in question.1 7 Nonetheless, the State executed Fairchild on
August 31, 1995.218
Don Paradis faces execution in Idaho despite "an abundance of evi-
dence" supporting Paradis's innocence, including several witnesses
who say he was not present when the victim was killed.2 9 An article
about Paradis's case in the New Yorker asked: "A reinvestigation of
the night's events reveals that Paradis may not have been the mur-
derer-so why is he about to be executed? 2
Joseph R. O'Dell 3d continues to face execution in Virginia, be-
cause the Virginia courts precluded him from introducing "a sophisti-
cated DNA test showing that the blood on his clothing could not have
been the murder victim's. ' 22' His federal habeas corpus appeal is cur-
rently pending in the Fourth Circuit.222
Paris Carriger faces execution in Arizona despite the fact that his in-
experienced lawyer spent only eleven hours preparing for his trial.223
Unresolved, ARIZ. REPUB., Jan. 5, 1995, at A13.
212. See Lynne Duke, A Matter of Law and Death, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED.,
Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1994, at 6.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id. at 8.
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at 7.
217. Id.
218. Man with Low I.Q. Executed for Murder, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, § 1, at 10.
219. Alec Wilkinson, A Night at the Beast House, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1995,
at 52, 68 (giving an extensive report on Paradis's conviction and death sentence).
220. Id. at 52.
221. See Kenneth B. Noble, As Executions Increase, Appeals Go to the Public, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at Al, A10.
222. Id. at AI0.
223. Id. Commenting on the case, Professor Samuel Gross of the University of
Michigan Law School stated:
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The defense failed to cross-examine the prosecution's star witness, a
convicted felon with a violent criminal history who had turned police
informer. 224 Later, that same witness-believing that he was going to
die-twice confessed to committing the murder and framing
Carriger.225 He recanted his first confession after recovering, but he
never recanted the second confession before dying.226 On December
1, 1995, the federal appeals court agreed to stay Carriger's execution
in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Schlup 227 that enables
federal habeas courts to re-evaluate cases such as this.228
B. Mentally Retarded and Severely Mentally Ill People Are Executed
Mentally retarded and severely mentally ill people continued to be
executed in 1995. One was Barry Lee Fairchild, who, as previously
discussed 229 was executed on August 31, 1995. Another was Mario
Marquez, who was executed in Texas on January 18, 1995.230
Marquez's jury never learned that he suffered from mental retarda-
tion-with an I.Q. of sixty-five-and was horse-whipped by his fa-
ther before being abandoned at age twelve.23'
In addition, Sylvester Adams was executed in South Carolina on
August 18, 1995.232 His defense counsel, who was later disbarred
and was serving time in federal prison at the time of Adams's execu-
tion,233 presented no mitigating evidence.234 As a result, the jury never
Everyone acknowledges that Dunbar lied at Paris Carriger's trial. What they're
demanding now is that he prove to the satisfaction of the court that he's
innocent. That's not how our system is designed to run, and if we keep doing
that, we're going to make a lot of terrible mistakes.
Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). See supra note 159 and accompanying
text.
228. Noble, supra note 221, at AI, A10.
229. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
230. Nat Hentoff, Executing the Retarded in Our Name, THE VILLAGE VOICE (New York
City), Feb. 21, 1995, at 30-31.
231. Id. at 30.
232. David W. MacDougal, Adams Dies Proclaiming His Faith, THE POST AND
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 19, 1995, at A17.
233. John Heilpren, Crowd Holds Vigil to Plead for Killer's Life; Governor's Mercy
Sought: The State Supreme Court Refused to Stay the Aug. 18 Execution, THE POST AND
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 12, 1995, at A17.
234. Suzanne Mortimer, Crime, Punishment and South Carolina; Obituary: Sylvester
Adams, THE GUARDIAN (Manchester, England), Aug. 26, 1995, at 30.
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learned of Adams's mental illness and mental retardation.235 One juror
later stated that she would have never voted for the death penalty had
she known of Adams's retardation.2 136 Her vote for life would have
been sufficient under South Carolina law to save Adams's life.237
Pennsylvania executed Leon Moser on August 16, 1995.38 Earlier
that day, the federal district court ordered a competency hearing be-
cause there was a serious question about Moser's mental compe-
tency.23 9 The judge stayed Moser's execution pending that hearing. 24°
At 7:40 p.m. that evening, the Supreme Court denied the State's ap-
peal of the order scheduling the competency hearing. 24' Then, at
11:09 p.m., the Supreme Court granted, by a five-to-four vote, the
State's motion to vacate the temporary stay of Moser's execution.242
Soon after, the federal district judge's law clerk called the prison
and asked if the prison had a cellular phone that could be used to con-
duct the competency hearing.243 A State lawyer responded that there
were no cellular phones there, but failed to add that Moser was a few
feet away from an open phone line.244 Pennsylvania Governor
Ridge's chief counsel, who was present, later said that he did not in-
form the clerk about the other phone because: "[T]here was no need to.
The judge's clerk asked a question about a cell phone. I did not feel it
was my place, nor is it my job, to anticipate what the judge might be
thinking. ' 24 Fifteen minutes later, the judge's clerk called again to
say that if Moser was still living the judge might want to talk with
247him.246 Moser had already been given a lethal injection.
On May 12, 1995, Varnall Weeks was executed in Alabama.24 8 He
was so severely mentally ill that shortly before his execution, a judge
found that he was insane according to "the dictionary generic definition
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (1995 Supp. Lawyer's Co-op. 1995).
238. See David Cole, A State Determined to Kill, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1995, at
A25.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Rick Bragg, Killer Racked by Delusions Is Put to Death in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1995, at 8 (Nat'l Ed.).
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of insanity."24 9 The major mental health groups in Alabama pleaded
unsuccessfully for commutation of his sentence.
250
C. Inmates Are Medically Saved Only To Be Executed
In two of the executions in 1995, people were given emergency
medical treatment, saved, and then quickly put to death. The first in-
stance occurred on August 11, 1995, and involved Oklahoma death
row inmate Robert Brecheen.2 5 1 Brecheen's execution was delayed
when guards had difficulty waking him in his holding cell from "a
self-induced drug stupor. 2 52 Prison officials took him to the hospital,
where his stomach was pumped.2 53 Brecheen then returned to the
State penitentiary where he was executed "with state-approved drugs"
two hours after the original execution time.254 The victim's survivor
praised prison officials, saying that "[ilt wasn't his job to take his
[own] life., 255 Reverend Bryan Brooks, however, observed: "This
shows the absurdity of the situation .... The idea that they're going
to stabilize him and bring him back to be executed is plainly outra-
geous. 25 6
Finally, on November 22, 1995, Illinois executed George Del
Vecchio. 257 He suffered a heart attack in late October and underwent
heart surgery early in November. 258 The authorities waited until he re-
covered somewhat from the heart surgery and then put him to death. 259
Evidently, Senator Robert Dole, the presumptive Republican presi-
dential nominee, would have expressed great disappointment if Mr.
Brecheen or Mr. Del Vecchio had died of natural causes rather than
being given medical treatment which enabled them to recover and be
executed. During his March 1996 trip to California's death chamber,
Senator Dole asked for a comparison of the number of California death
row inmates who had died of natural causes during the last twenty-five
249. Colman McCarthy, Insane and on Death Row, WASH. POST, May 6, 1995, at
AI5.
250. Alabama Set to Execute Killer Despite His Insanity, THE PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 12, 1995, at IA.
25 1. See A Doomed Inmate Drugs Himself Is Revived and Then Executed, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1995, at 6 (Nat'l Ed.).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Man Who Had Heart Surgery Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1995, at A22.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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years and the number who had been executed."6° When told that eight
more had died of natural causes, Senator Dole asked "[i]s that justice?"
and indicated that this was an additional reason to enact habeas-limiting
legislation.26'
D. Pervasive Racial Discrimination Exists in
Our Capital Punishment System
One of the many misleading impressions left by the O.J. Simpson
trial is that being African American is an advantage for a criminal de-
fendant. That trial, however, in which the prosecution did not seek the
death penalty and deliberately selected a venue in which it was ex-
tremely likely that African Americans would be a majority of the ju-
rors, is the exception, not the rule.262 Racial discrimination continues
to pervade the prosecution of death penalty cases.263 Indeed, as
Scharlette Holdman explained, the O.J. Simpson jury selection was
extremely aberrational even for Los Angeles.264 Indigent African
American and Latino capital defendants in Los Angeles County "are
often tried by all-white juries. ' '265 Holdman noted that this same phe-
nomenon exists elsewhere in California.26
District Attorney McCann pointed out that racism can infect the
criminal justice system even in very liberal counties. 67 A study of two
such counties-Milwaukee and Dane-in Wisconsin, found that
racism played a role in sentencing for two types of crime.26
Maryland State's Attorney Sonner regretfully acknowledged that de-
spite his office's best efforts to be racially neutral, eleven of the thir-
teen people for whom his office has sought the death penalty have
been African Americans, even though African Americans are only
260. Seelye, supra note 172, at A14.
261. Id.
262. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 584; see also Michael G.
Millman, in The O.J. Simpson Case and Capital Punishment, 38 How. L.J. 247, 250-61
(1995) (discussing the L.A. County District Attorney's decision not to seek the death
penalty and the choice of venue in the Simpson case).
263. For an earlier analysis of this issue, see Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?
Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777
(1990-91).
264. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 584.
265. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 585.
266. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 583-85.
267. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 597.
268. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 597.
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eight to ten percent of his county's population.269 He lamented that
"racism is very much an ugly part of the American character today.270
As District Attorney McCann noted, the Supreme Court, in McCles-
key v. Kemp,27' invited legislative action to deal with racial discrim-
ination in our capital punishment system.27 2 The leading legislative
proposal in that regard, most commonly referred to as the Racial Jus-
tice Act,273 has not been enacted, although it has passed the House of
Representatives on two occasions. As a result, there is no effective
means in most jurisdictions to combat racial discrimination in capital
274sentencing.
VII. CURRENT UNITED STATES POLICY ON EXECUTIONS
COUNTERS WORLDWIDE TRENDS
Most industrialized Western democracies repealed their death
penalty laws long before 1995. Indeed, in 1995, as the United States
executed people at an accelerated pace, South Africa's highest court
held the death penalty to be unconstitutional, 275 and Ukraine an-
nounced in November 1995 that within three years it would abolish
capital punishment.276
In the various opinions supporting its unanimous holding, Justices
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa relied
heavily on the egregious unfairness of capital punishment in the United
States.277 Justice after Justice cited the dissents of Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, and Brennan, all of whom concluded that capital punishment
could never be constitutional. The most-often cited of these was
269. See Comments by Andrew L. Sonner, infra, at 604.
270. See Comments by Andrew L. Sonner, infra, at 604.
271. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
272. Id. at 319; see Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 594-95.
273. Racial Justice Act, H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 601-11 (1994); see
Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 594-97. For an analysis of an earlier
version of the Racial Justice Act, see Tabak, supra note 263.
274. New York's new capital punishment statute does provide a means to challenge
racially discriminatory death sentences. N.Y. Correction Law § 27 (McKinney Supp.
1996) (amending N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.30 (McKinney 1994)). But it
remains to be seen how effectively that portion of the statute will be implemented by the
New York courts.
275. Judgment of June 6, 1995, (State v. Makwanyane), Constitutional Court, No.
CCT/3/94, slip op. at 72 (Rep. S. Afr.) (opinion on file with the Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal).
276. Ukraine, Macedonia Join Europe Council, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 10,
1995, at A18. Ukraine agreed to abolish capital punishment within three years after
joining the Council of Europe. Id.
277. See, e.g., Judgment of June 6, 1995, (State v. Makwanyane), slip op. at 22.
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Justice Blackmun's 1994 dissent in Callins v. Collins.278 After having
voted to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1972 and
1976,279 Justice Blackmun concluded in Callins that our capital pun-
ishment system is so unfairly implemented that he could no longer take
part in "the machinery of death.' '2W
Reverend Michael Place discussed a "rather significant develop-
ment" that recently took place within the Catholic Church.28' Pope
John Paul II's latest encyclical reversed the Church's historical view
on capital punishment, a view from which the Church had already
been moving, but never before in such a definitive way.282 The en-
cyclical stated that the death penalty should be carried out only if the
government has no other alternative way to protect innocent people
against crime. 283 The Pope added that in today's world, such situa-
tions rarely, if ever, exist.284 Indeed, the Bishops of the United States
have concluded that such situations never exist in the United States.285
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is increasingly difficult for anyone who studies the current struc-
ture of our death penalty system to assert that the process even re-
motely approaches a modicum of fairness. The demise of the PCDOs,
and the grave threats to the future of habeas corpus proceedings, make
the situation worse than ever.
The organized bar has a unique perspective on this situation, be-
cause attorneys are intimately involved in every stage of the capital
punishment process. It is high time that bar organizations inform the
public that our capital punishment system has become so fundamen-
tally unfair that its continued operation, at least in anything resembling
its current form, cannot be countenanced. That conclusion inexorably
flows not from any philosophical view about the death penalty in the
278. 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-414 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from holding that the death penalty, as imposed by the then-existing
Georgia scheme, was unconstitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurring with the judgment that the death penalty was not
per se unconstitutional) (citing the dissenting opinions, including his own, from
Furman).
280. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
281. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 611-14.
282. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 612.
283. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 611-14.
284. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 612-14.
285. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 612-14.
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abstract, but rather from respect for our Constitution and Bill of
Rights.
